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H
UMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS HAVE long criticized
corporations operating in war-torn countries for maxi-
mizing profits at the expense of human rights.
Shareholders’ primary concern with the bottom line
often leads corporate decision-makers to purchase raw materials in
developing countries at the cheapest price, regardless of the human
rights credentials of their suppliers. Some corporations, increasingly
concerned by allegations of complicity in human rights abuses, are
implementing stronger monitoring devices to ensure that they comply
with international standards. 
Other companies intentionally engage in illegal business ven-
tures with armed groups in places where weak judiciaries are unlikely
to prosecute much-needed investors for corporate malfeasance. In
countries experiencing ongoing civil conflict, the systematic elimina-
tion of independent judges, prosecutors, and witnesses willing to tes-
tify reduces the likelihood of prosecution and weakens the rule of law.
This article explores the possibility of holding corporate officers and
managers criminally responsible before the International Criminal
Court (ICC) for grave human rights violations committed by their
agents, employees, or business partners, using the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC) as a test case.
BACKGROUND
NEARLY TWO YEARS AFTER THE ROME STATUTE entered into force,
the ICC is now almost fully operational. The Court has jurisdiction over
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide committed after July
1, 2002. The Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) may receive referrals of
cases from the UN Security Council, states, individuals, and non-gov-
ernmental organizations, but the OTP may also act on its own initiative
to investigate and prosecute cases, with authorization from the Pre-Trial
Chambers. The ICC may try the nationals of states parties as well as the
nationals of non-ratifying states if they commit certain crimes within
the territory of a state party. Under the principle of complementarity
embodied in the Statute, the Court only has jurisdiction when the rele-
vant states are unable or unwilling to prosecute. Chief Prosecutor Luis
Moreno Ocampo made clear in his September 2003 policy paper that
the OTP intends to focus the Court’s limited resources on those leaders
who bear the most responsibility for crimes, “such as the leaders of the
state or organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.” 
The ICC can prosecute heads of state, political and military lead-
ers, and the leaders of irregular warring factions, yet corporations are
not subject to criminal liability before the ICC. Some delegations
argued during the drafting stages of the Rome Statute that the inclu-
sion of corporations within the Court’s jurisdiction would facilitate
victims’ compensation. Others cautioned that the evidentiary chal-
lenges of prosecuting legal entities, and many national legal systems’
rejection of the criminal liability of corporations, made the exclusion
of corporations from ICC jurisdiction more appropriate. Following
the philosophy of the Nuremberg Tribunal that “international crimes
are committed by men, not by abstract entities,” article 25(1) of the
Rome Statute ulimately limited the Court’s jurisdiction to “natural
persons.” The OTP may prosecute corporate officers, managers, and
employees, but not the corporate entity itself. 
From Nuremberg to the ad hoc tribunals for the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, international courts have found individual
corporate officers, managers, and employees criminally responsible for
war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Moreno Ocampo
has recently made several statements indicating the OTP’s interest in
investigating the financial links to crimes committed in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). In the OTP policy paper,
Moreno Ocampo stated that “financial transactions … for the pur-
chase of arms used in murder, may well provide evidence proving the
commission of such atrocities.” 
At the September 2003 Assembly of States Parties, Moreno
Ocampo announced that his office is closely following the situation in
the Ituri district of the northeastern DRC, where massacres, rape, and
forcible displacement routinely occur. While it is not certain that the
first cases before the Court will be from the DRC, the chief prosecu-
tor revealed that he is prepared to seek authorization from the Pre-
Trial Chambers to begin an investigation of those responsible for the
crimes committed there. He emphasized the possibility that those who
direct operations in the extractive industries “may also be the authors
of crimes, even if they are based in other countries” (emphasis added).
Such statements, along with the broad prosecutorial discretion grant-
ed to the OTP, lead some to wonder how far the Court will go in pur-
suing military, political, and even corporate leaders.
THE TEST CASE: CIVIL WAR AND THE EXTRACTIVE
INDUSTRIES IN DRC
MORE THAN THREE MILLION CIVILIANS have died in the DRC since
1998, making it the most devastating conflict to civilians since World
War II. At least 5,000 civilians have died in the Ituri district alone since
July 1, 2002, the effective date of the Court’s temporal jurisdiction.
Before the upsurge in violence in May 2003, the United Nations esti-
mated that the violence in Ituri had internally displaced approximately
500,000 people, or ten percent of the area’s population. On January 16,
2004, a massacre in Ituri left an estimated 100 dead, prompting the
chief prosecutor to announce a few days later at the International
Conference Against Genocide that he will select two cases from Ituri by
mid-2004, and hopes to begin investigations by October. If this time-
line proceeds as planned, trials could begin in 2005.
The root of the current conflict dates back to May 1997, when
the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo, led by
Laurent Kabila, overthrew the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko.
Rwanda and Uganda supported Kabila’s uprising, but soon became
concerned that his regime would not expel the Rwandan Hutu
extremists hiding in eastern DRC after the Rwandan genocide.
Uganda and Rwanda invaded the country in 1998 to destabilize the
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Kabila government, ostensibly to prevent a Hutu invasion of Rwanda
and to protect ethnic Tutsis in the DRC. In the process, however, they
heightened regional and tribal tensions, supported Congolese rebels,
and strategically positioned themselves to exploit the DRC’s coveted
mineral resources. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia sent troops to
back Kabila. He managed to retain power until his assassination in
January 2001, when his son Joseph was appointed to succeed him. 
As the war continued, the DRC government maintained control
of only the western half of the country, leaving the eastern DRC an
occupied territory under the primary control of Uganda and its local
proxies from 1998 to 2003. During that time, Uganda dramatically
increased its exports of diamonds, gold, and coltan, a rare mineral
used in cellular phones and laptop computers, from the rebel-held
Congolese territory. The Ugandan army helped arm and train the
approximately ten armed insurgent groups that currently exist in Ituri,
instigating ethnic feuds between the Hema and Lendu militias to gain
access to the region’s vast mineral resources. 
Under mounting international pressure, Rwanda and Uganda
agreed in July and August 2002, respectively, to withdraw their troops
from the eastern DRC. By mid-2003, most foreign troops had offi-
cially pulled out of the region, but the Ugandan Peoples’ Defense
Forces (UPDF) trained local paramilitary forces to protect the eco-
nomic interests of the UPDF officers after their departure. The
Rwandan Patriotic Army left in place certain officers from battalions
specializing in mining activities to perform the same functions as
apparent civilians. While their withdrawal was a positive development
for the resolution of the conflict, the exiting powers left in their wake
an intricate web of actors in a self-financing war economy. 
THE UN PANEL OF EXPERTS FOR THE DRC
In June 2000, the Security Council established a Panel of Experts
on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of
Wealth in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Panel) to investigate the
extent to which investment in the extractive industries fueled the war. In
its October 2002 report, the Panel alleged that 85 companies were
involved in business activities in the DRC that breache the Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD). American, European, and
South African corporations figure high on the list. The Panel also named
specific Congolese and international businesspeople as well as high-rank-
ing military officers and political officials from Uganda, the DRC,
Zimbabwe, and Rwanda who were connected to illegal mining activities
and arms trafficking. The violations include “theft, embezzlement, diver-
sion of public funds, undervaluation of goods, smuggling, false invoicing,
non-payment of taxes, kickbacks to public officials and bribery.”
The Panel’s 2002 report provoked strong reaction from the com-
panies and countries it alleged were helping to perpetuate the war in
the DRC. Western governments and business lobbies pressured the
UN to excise a controversial section of the Panel’s subsequent 2003
report that detailed the continued participation of military officials
and businesses in the illegal export of minerals. The UN complied,
voicing concerns that the information could endanger the DRC’s tran-
sitional government. The 2003 report also states that cases against 48
of the companies have been resolved, while the rest of the cases are
either pending or require further monitoring. 
The 2002 report describes in great detail the way in which “elite
networks” of political and military leaders, as well as businessmen and
certain rebel leaders, cooperate to protect and exploit resources and gen-
erate revenue in areas controlled by the DRC government, Rwanda, and
Uganda. By controlling the various armies and local security forces and
carrying out select acts of violence, these elite networks monopolize the
production, commerce, and financing involved in extracting diamonds,
gold, copper, cobalt, and coltan. Rebel administrations in the occupied
territories serve as fronts for these international operations, generating
public revenue which is then diverted into network coffers. 
The elite network operating in the government-controlled area
of the DRC is comprised of Congolese and Zimbabwean government
officials and private businesspeople. This network transfers publicly
owned mineral assets by way of secret contracts to joint ventures con-
trolled by private companies, amounting to a multi-billion dollar cor-
porate theft of the DRC’s public assets. Officials in the Congolese gov-
ernment grant mining licenses and export permits to the companies in
exchange for personal gain. The Congolese government then uses rev-
enue from the sale of diamonds and other resources to purchase  arms
for the Congolese Armed Forces. 
The Congo Desk of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) cen-
trally manages the elite network in the Rwandan-controlled area of
the DRC, linking the commercial and military activities of the
RPA. A  Panel source claims that income to the Congo Desk
accounted for 80% of the RPA’s revenues in 1999, thus facilitating
Rwanda’s continued commercial presence in the DRC. The RPA
controls most of the coltan mining in the eastern DRC, does not
pay taxes on the extracted mineral, and uses forced labor, reported-
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ly including prisoners brought in from Rwanda who work as inden-
tured servants. In the Ugandan-controlled area, the elite network is
decentralized and loosely hierarchical. The Panel reported that the
network generates revenue “from the export of primary materials,
from controlling the import of consumables, [and] from theft and
tax fraud.” The UPDF have trained local militias, and the elite net-
work has fostered ethnic tension by alternately favoring Hema and
Lendu businessmen and politicians, leading to increased violence in
the region.
Corporations could thus be implicated in, and found criminally
liable for, a number of violations of international criminal law com-
mitted in the DRC. Such violations include subjecting local popula-
tions, including children, to forced labor in the extraction of natural
resources; the torture, rape, and murder of thousands of civilians dur-
ing military operations to secure mineral-rich land; and the destruc-
tion of agricultural infrastructure to force peasant farmers to partici-
pate in extractive work, resulting in reduced food supplies and slave-
like conditions in the coltan mines. 
PPOSECUTION OF CORPORATE CRIMINALS BEFORE THE ICC
To the extent that corporate officers and managers play a role at
all in the atrocities, they are more likely to remain behind the scenes,
issuing secret orders, turning a blind eye to “efficient” business prac-
tices, or supplying the means to commit the crime. Under the Rome
Statute, direct participation in the crime is not necessary to establish
the criminal liability of corporate officers and managers. The OTP
may invoke theories of “intermediary participation,” such as com-
mand responsibility and accomplice liability, to hold them account-
able for acts committed by others. 
Command or Superior Responsibility 
Under the theory of command responsibility, an official com-
mander, or one effectively acting as a commander, may be individ-
ually criminally responsible for failing to supervise properly and
control the conduct of others acting under his or her effective
authority and control. Articles 6(3) and 7(3) of the Statutes for the
International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former
Yugoslavia, respectively, provide for command responsibility, but
they do not differentiate between military commanders and civilian
superiors. In a controversial departure from that approach, the US
delegation to Rome proposed distinct “state-of-mind” requirements
for the liability of military commanders on the one hand and civil-
ian superiors on the other. Examples of people who might fall under
the category of civilian superiors are government officials, corporate
officers and managers, and even teachers and leaders of social
groups and churches. After much debate and compromise, the del-
egates adopted this distinction in article 28 of the Rome Statute. 
Article 28(b) governs civilian superiors and imposes a much
more rigorous test than does 28(a), which pertains to military com-
manders. A military commander may be criminally liable if he or she
either knew or should have known of a subordinate’s criminal activities
and failed to take “all necessary and reasonable measures within his or
her power to prevent or repress their commission” or to inform the
competent authorities.  In contrast, for the Court to hold civilian
authorities criminally liable for their subordinates’ conduct, article
28(b)(i) provides that the prosecutor must demonstrate that the supe-
rior “either knew, or consciously disregarded information which clearly
indicated the subordinates were committing or about to commit” a
crime (emphasis added). This more rigid state-of-mind requirement,
akin to willful blindness, may be difficult to meet in most cases. 
The prosecution must also establish a superior-subordinate rela-
tionship based on either de jure control, emanating from an official
delegation of power, or de facto control. By definition, such a rela-
tionship does not exist among equals. It seems unlikely, therefore, that
the Court will deem a corporate officer or manager the superior of his
or her rebel trading partners or of fellow corporate actors with whom
he or she designs and implements criminal plans. A superior-subordi-
nate relationship may be established, however, if the clients are acting
at the behest of the corporation when they commit the crime (e.g.,
while providing security for mining facilities or when carrying out
orders to assassinate a company’s union members). The prosecutor
could establish such a relationship by showing that the subordinates
who committed the crime were under the accused’s actual and effec-
tive control when they acted. 
It is not unprecedented for an international tribunal to find a
corporate manager liable on the theory of superior responsibility. In
Prosecutor v. Musema, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda convicted the director of a tea factory and sentenced him
to life imprisonment for acts of genocide and crimes against
humanity that his employees perpetrated against Tutsi refugees. The
Trial Chamber found that Musema exercised effective control over
the employees of the tea factory, but it was not satisfied that he
exercised such control over other groups of perpetrators, such as the
interahamwe paramilitary forces and plantation workers. Thus, the
standard for effective authority and control is high—it is not mere-
ly one’s capacity to influence local armed groups that triggers supe-
rior responsibility, but rather actual and effective subordination
stemming from an exercise of that influence. This will be easier to
prove when a corporation directly employs the perpetrators.
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Aiding and Abetting, or Accomplice Liability
Article 25 of the Rome Statute provides a less rigorous means of
holding corporate war criminals accountable for acts committed by
others. Unlike superior responsibility, aiding and abetting liability
requires that the accused act knowingly. Because it does not require a
superior-subordinate relationship, article 25 might be an appropriate
mechanism for holding corporate actors accountable for transactions
with suppliers whom they know procure raw materials by means of
grave human rights abuses.
Section 3(a) of article 25 provides that a person can commit a
crime “whether as an individual, jointly with another or through
another person,” and section 3(b) covers one who “orders, solicits, or
induces” the commission or attempted commission of a crime.
Section 3(c) establishes that a person will be individually responsible
for a crime if that person “aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its com-
mission or attempted commission, including providing the means for
its commission” (emphasis added). A person could also be criminally
liable under section 3(d) if he or she “in any other way contributes”
to a crime or an attempted crime by a group of persons acting with a
common purpose. That section further provides that such contribu-
tions can be made either with the aim of furthering the group’s crim-
inal activity or purpose, or simply with the knowledge that the group
intends to commit the crime.
The Rome Statute does not specify what constitutes the provi-
sion of means to commit a crime and the forms of contribution for
facilitating the commission of a crime required for aiding and abet-
ting liability. In the Zyklon B Case (1946), the British Military Court
convicted German industrialist Bruno Tesch, the owner of a compa-
ny that supplied poison gas and corresponding equipment, for selling
Zyklon B gas to the Nazi S.S., knowing that the S.S. was using it to
kill allied nationals in concentration camps. By analogy, if a compa-
ny operating in the DRC trades weapons for diamonds, the ICC
might deem such weapons the means for the commission of a crime.
However, if a corporation purchases diamonds from a rebel group or
a state whose military uses the revenue to purchase arms for use
against civilians, will the purchase money itself fall within the defini-
tion of “means of commission” or “contribution” to the crime? Or
would the corporation have to pay more than fair market value for
the commodities it purchases from known human rights violators for
such payment to constitute a contribution? The Court will have to
grapple with these and other complicated questions in 2004 as it
begins to develop its own jurisprudence based on the cases it accepts
from the DRC or other countries. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
THE INTRICATE AND EXTENSIVELY DOCUMENTED web of corpo-
rate involvement in the DRC’s brutal conflict would make it an inter-
esting test case for holding corporate officers and mangers accountable
for the role they play in exacerbating civil conflicts. The chief prose-
cutor has been outspoken in his interest in investigating the financial
transactions behind the war crimes in the DRC. The OTP already has
a considerable amount of investigatory work from the UN Panel of
Experts at its disposal if it decides to pursue leading international busi-
nesspeople in the Antwerp and New York diamond markets or high-
tech companies that rely on Congolese cobalt. The imprisonment at
The Hague of corporate executives would further the Court’s goal of
deterrence and motivate corporations to monitor more strictly their
business activities in war-torn countries.
However, practical limitations might result in few, if any, prose-
cutions of corporate officers. States and corporations may simply
refuse to cooperate with the OTP’s requests for information or extra-
dition of corporate officers. Moreover, the OTP is acutely aware that
its work will be under the microscope of the international communi-
ty and that the Court’s legitimacy rests on avoiding charges of politi-
cization. Thus, the OTP may decide to tread lightly on what surely
will be controversial grounds and shy away from high-level prosecu-
tions of corporate officers until the Court establishes a reputation of
fairness and neutrality.
Given the high legal hurdles imposed by article 25(3) and, to a
lesser extent, article 28(b), it might be difficult to successfully prose-
cute individuals on the grounds of corporate complicity or superior
responsibility in the DRC and elsewhere in future cases. If the OTP
moves forward with an investigation in the DRC, the Security
Council should make available all of the information the UN Panel
uncovered in its investigation of corporate involvement in the war.
The cooperation of the international community, particularly the
intelligence services and the attorneys general of African as well as
European and American governments, will be essential in allowing the
prosecutor to investigate the financial transactions that fuel the war.
The referral of the DRC case by an African country would further
strengthen the Court’s legitimacy among developing countries. If the
OTP begins investigating the DRC, human rights advocates in Africa
and in countries with commercial links to the country should pressure
their governments to cooperate fully with the investigation, as it will
set an important precedent for the relationship between the Court and
the international community. 
In the DRC and elsewhere, NGOs and human rights advocates
who seek to hold corporations accountable for their contributions to
serious human rights abuses should focus their investigative work on
the issues presented here and forward relevant information to the
Office of the Prosecutor. The most critical information is that which
helps establish the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship,
the state of mind of corporate officers and managers, and the aiding
and abetting of crimes. Activists from countries whose nationals and
corporations the UN Panel has identified as having violated interna-
tional human rights and humanitarian law principles while in the
DRC should pressure those companies to adhere to the OECD
Guidelines, while pressuring the governments where those companies
are registered to investigate and take appropriate action against them.
Activists in the United States should pressure their congressional rep-
resentatives to strike the provisions of the American Servicemembers
Protection Act of 2002 that prohibits the US government from coop-
erating with ICC investigations.
Finally, those countries concerned that the Court might exer-
cise jurisdiction over their nationals doing business in the DRC
should conduct thorough, transparent investigations and, if neces-
sary, prosecute their own corporate officers. In this way, the princi-
ple of complementarity will serve to keep cases off the ICC’s dock-
et and ensure that corporate officers are brought to justice in their
own countries.  HRB
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